

CHRONOLOGY OF UN VISITS AND REPORTS

Since 1990, eight envoys have been appointed by the United Nations system to facilitate dialogue between the junta and the pro-democracy forces, and to carry out fact-finding mission in Burma.

Years	Name	Mandate/Title	Country visits	Dates of visits
1990	Sadako Ogata (Japan)	Independent Expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the human rights situation in Myanmar	1	
1992-1996	Yozo Yokota (Japan)	Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights Myanmar	4	7 to 14 December 1992; 9 to 16 November 1993; 7 to 16 November 1994; 8 to 17 October 1995
1996-2000	Rajsoomer Lallah (Mauritius)	Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights Myanmar	0	
1995-1999	Alvaro de Soto (Peru)	Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs (1995-1997) / Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar (1997-1999)	6	6 to 8 February 1995; 13 to 19 August 1995; 7 to 10 May 1997; 20 to 23 January 1998; 27 to 30 October 1998; 14 to 18 October 1999
2000-2008	Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Brazil)	Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights Myanmar	7	3 to 5 April 2001; 9 to 17 October 2001; 10 to 19 February 2002; 17 to 28 October 2002; 19 to 24 March 2003; 3 to 8 November 2003; 11 to 15 November 2007
2000-2006	Razali Ismail (Malaysia)	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	12	29 June to 3 July 2000; 9 to 12 October 2000; 5 to 9 January 2001; 1 to 4 June 2001; 27 to 30 August 2001; 27 November to 3 December 2001; 23 to 26 April 2002; 2 to 6 August 2002; 12 to 16 November 2002; 6 to 10 June 2003; 30 September to 2 October 2003; 1 to 4 March 2004
2006-current	Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)	UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs (2006-2007) / UN Special Advisor on Myanmar (2007- current)	5	18 to 20 May 2006; 9 to 12 November 2006; 29 September to 2 October 2007; 3 to 8 November 2007; 6 to 10 March 2008
2008-current	Thomás Ojea Quintana (Argentina)	Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights Myanmar	0	

1990

In **November**, the Independent Expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Sadako Ogata, visited Burma.

In her **December** report on her visit submitted to the CHR on her visit, Ogata indicated that it had not been determined when the representatives of the Pyithu Hluttaw (Parliament) elected in May would be convened to draft Burma's new constitution.

1992

On **10 June**, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Yozo Yokota as UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma to implement the Commission's resolution 1992/58.

In **December**, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) told the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that the representatives elected in the 1990 elections would be tasked with drafting Burma's new constitution through the National Convention. However, the NLD – who had won 392 of the 485 seats in the 1990 election - was allowed to send only 97 MPs out of the 702 delegates named to the National Convention. SLORC also told Yokota that they were “sincere” in their wish to cooperate with the United Nations. Yokota however noted that SLORC authorities did not extend him “full and unreserved cooperation” during the visit. He was not allowed to see any of the detainees he had requested to meet, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

1993

On **10 November**, SLORC Secretary-1, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, told UN Special Rapporteur Yozo Yokota that it was “still too early” for a visit to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but that it might be “perhaps possible in the future.” When asked if the SLORC intended to release her on 20 July 1994, Khin Nyunt answered that it was still too early to say.



CHR, 49th session, 17 February 1993, E/CN.4/1993/37



UNGA, 48th session, 16 November 1993, A/48/578

1994

In his **February** report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota said that given the composition of the delegates (only one out of seven delegates was elected in the May 1990 elections), the restrictions imposed upon the delegates, and the general guidelines to be strictly followed, the National Convention did not constitute the necessary “steps towards the restoration to democracy.”

On **20 September**, SLORC Chairman Than Shwe and SLORC Secretary-1, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. A second meeting between Khin Nyunt and Daw Suu was held in October.

On **14 November**, SLORC Secretary-1, General Khin Nyunt, assured UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that once the new constitution had been drafted and adopted elections would take place and a civilian government would take power. Khin Nyunt said that it was not the moment to specify when a new civilian government would be formed under the new constitution. However, he said the junta wanted to complete the National Convention “as soon as possible.” Yokota requested to visit Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but Khin Nyunt said that it was not the appropriate moment for a visit as the junta was holding discussions with her and did not want any interference in that dialogue. Khin Nyunt said they intended to continue its dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the future.



CHR, 50th session, 16 February 1994, E/CN.4/1994/57



UNGA, 49th session, 28 October 1994, A/49/594

1995

In his **January** report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Yozo Yokota said that given the composition of the delegates (only one out of seven delegates was elected in the May 1990 elections), the restrictions imposed upon the delegates, and the general guidelines to be strictly followed, the National Convention did not constitute the necessary “steps towards the restoration to democracy.”

In **February**, the SLORC informed Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto that although no meetings had been held with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi since the end of October, it was the junta's intention to meet again with the pro-democracy leader.

On **10 July**, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. The following day, she told reporters she was dedicated to the restoration in Burma and called for a dialogue between the military junta, the democracy movement and non-Burman ethnic nationality groups. She also urged a rethinking of foreign investment in Burma.

In **August**, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto tried to encourage the SLORC to open a substantive political dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other elected political leaders. In reply, SLORC pointed out that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was an ordinary citizen, that in 1990 there were as many as 230 political parties with which it would be impossible to establish a dialogue, and that it would not be fair to single out only one of them. The SLORC also said that nothing should be done to detract attention from the National Convention, which was the designated forum for political dialogue.

On **16 October**, SLORC Secretary-1, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, assured the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Yozo Yokota that the junta had direct contact with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, but it had so many important tasks to achieve in terms of economic and social development that at that time it was not a priority to resume its dialogue with her.



CHR, 51st session, 12 January 1995, E/CN.4/1995/65



CHR, 51st session, 21 February 1995, E/CN.4/1995/150



UNGA, 50th session, 16 October 1995, A/50/568



UNGA, 50th session, 24 November 1995, A/50/782

1996

In his **February** report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur, Yozo Yokota, said that given the composition of the delegates (only one out of seven delegates was elected in the May 1990 elections), the restrictions imposed upon the delegates, and the general guidelines to be strictly followed, the National Convention did not constitute the necessary “steps towards the restoration to democracy.”

On **4 April**, SLORC Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw told Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto that the National Convention continued to be the only forum for a dialogue with political leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Ohn Gyaw also said that the SLORC's priority was “national reconsolidation” and the eradication of national insurgencies.

In his **April** report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed regret that the SLORC did not follow up on the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other prominent political leaders with the opening of a substantive dialogue as called for by the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights.

On **12 May**, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Yoza Yokota resigned, claiming he did not have the resources to carry out his work. In June, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Rajsoomer Lallah as the new UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma.

In his **November** report to the General Assembly, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed disappointment that it had not been possible for his envoys to visit Burma since the adoption of resolution 50/194 in December 1995. Annan also expressed “regret” that no progress could be reported in the areas on which the General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission had repeatedly expressed concern.



CHR, 52nd session, 5 February 1996, E/CN.4/1996/65



CHR, 52nd session, 17 April 1996, E/CN.4/1996/157



UNGA, 51st session, 8 October 1996, A/51/466



UNGA, 51st session, 8 November 1996, A/51/660

1997

In **July**, SLORC Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt met with NLD Chairman Aung Shwe and two members of the party’s Central Executive Committee.

On **1 October**, SLORC Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw reiterated that a substantive political dialogue with the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was only possible within the framework of the National Convention. Ohn Gyaw suggested that contacts with the NLD might be held in stages, leaving open the possibility that they might lead to discussions on substantive matters. Ohn Gyaw also refused to give a time-frame for the resumption of the National Convention, which had not convened since March 1996.

In his **November** report to the General Assembly, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed contacts between the junta and the NLD as an initial step for a genuine political dialogue. Annan also welcomed the fact that the NLD could hold a party congress. He expressed “disappointment” that no further progress had been made with regard to the areas of concern of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights.



CHR, 53rd session, 6 February 1997, E/CN.4/1997/64



UNGA, 52nd session, 16 October 1997, A/52/484



UNGA, 52nd session, 10 November 1997, A/52/587

1998

On **17 April**, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah said that two years after assuming the mandate he had seen “no change in the political or human rights situation” in Burma. Lallah said that the military regime did not wish to engage in a political dialogue unless the NLD ceased its political activities.

In **18 August**, SLORC Secretary-1, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, met with NLD Chairman Aung Shwe. The junta considered the meeting fruitful and expected it would be the first of a series of confidence-building talks between the regime and the NLD. However, the junta used the NLD’s 21 August 1998 call for the convening of the parliament as a pretext for not holding follow-up meetings with the party Chairman.

In **October**, the SPDC justified the curtailment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom of movement out of concerns for her own safety. The junta claimed that Daw Suu’s call for a boycott of investment and tourism and her support of sanctions had rendered her “widely unpopular.”

In his **November** report to the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his “disappointment” for the lack of genuine, substantive progress on the part of the SPDC in addressing the recommendations of previous General Assembly resolutions.



CHR, 54th session, 15 January 1998, E/CN.4/1998/70



UNGA, 53rd session, 10 September 1998, A/53/364



UNGA, 53rd session, 10 November 1998, A/53/657

1999

In his **October** report to the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that there was no concrete progress on issues of concern of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights.



CHR, 55th session, 22 January 1999, E/CN.4/1999/35



UNGA, 54th session, 4 October 1999, A/54/440



UNGA, 54th session, 27 October 1999, A/54/499

2000

On **4 April**, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Razali Ismail as UN Special Envoy for Burma. His mandate was to facilitate the implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution 54/186.

On **24 August**, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and a dozen other NLD leaders were stopped near Dala, on the outskirts of Rangoon. On **2 September**, after a nine-day standoff, SPDC authorities brought Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leaders back to Rangoon and confined them to their homes. On **14 September**, SPDC authorities lifted the restrictions. However, on **21 September**, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders attempted to travel to Mandalay. The regime brought Daw Aung San Suu Kyi back from the Rangoon train station and again confined her to her home.

In his **October** report to the General Assembly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed hopes that Razali's discussions with the SPDC's top leadership and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would result in "a new momentum for a resumption of the process of dialogue between the two sides" in the following months.

On **26 October**, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah said that the policy of SPDC over the past several years still continued to "privilege the repression of all political activity over the engagement in a genuine political dialogue." Lallah concluded that it was an "unfortunate and regrettable duty" to address the UN General Assembly year after year to report on a human rights situation that showed no improvement and discarded the repeated resolutions of this Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights.

On **2 November 2000**, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Rajsoomer Lallah resigned, citing lack of logistical and administrative support from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. "I see very little changing, year after year the General Assembly and the Commission pass resolutions, I feel rather disappointed," he said following his resignation. Lallah was never allowed to enter Burma during his four-year mandate.



CHR, 56th session, 24 January 2000, E/CN.4/2000/38



UNGA, 55th session, 22 August 2000, A/55/359



UNGA, 55th session, 20 October 2000, A/55/509

2001

In **January**, the SPDC began releasing political prisoners, relaxing the rules restricting political activities, and allowing NLD township offices in Rangoon and Mandalay districts to reopen.

On **6 February**, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Paulo Sergio Pinheiro to serve as the new UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma. "I am very encouraged by recent positive and constructive developments in Myanmar, especially with regard to the progress in the field of national reconciliation," Pinheiro said after his appointment.

In his **August** report to the General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro said that against the background of ongoing talks between the SPDC and the NLD there had been some positive signals indicative of the junta's endeavor to make progress in the area of human rights. Among the positive developments, Pinheiro highlighted the dissemination of human rights standards for public officials, the work of the SPDC's Committee on Human Rights, the release of political detainees, the reopening of branches of the NLD, the continued international monitoring of prison conditions, and the cooperation with the Commission on Human Rights.

In **October**, after an interval of six years, the SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi resumed talks on national reconciliation. The specific details of the process were not known, as both sides agreed to maintain the substance of their discussions confidential. UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail was the catalyst behind the "secret talks" between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime. Razali had visited Burma several times with a view to facilitating dialogue between the two sides.

In **October**, SPDC Secretary-1 Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt assured UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro of the junta's full cooperation. Khin Nyunt told Pinheiro that the junta was genuinely committed to improving the well-being of the population. Khin Nyunt also acknowledged the need to improve human rights and engage in political transition.



UNGA, 56th session, 20 August 2001, A/56/312



UNGA, 56th session, 24 October 2001, A/56/505

2002

On **6 May**, the SPDC released Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after 19 months of house arrest. On the same day, the SPDC issued a statement entitled “Turning of a New Page”, which read: “[...] We shall recommit ourselves to allowing all of our citizens to participate freely in the life of our political process, while giving priority to national unity, peace and stability of the country.” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi commented on that occasion that it marked the end of the confidence building phase of secret talks between herself and the SPDC, which had been facilitated by the UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail in September 2000. Her release occurred following Razali’s seventh visit to Rangoon. Pinheiro referred to the recent developments as a “new phase of testing confidence building in action”. He also said that the atmosphere surrounding Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release was reported to be much better than it was in 1995. Pinheiro concluded by saying that the move from the “confidence-building phase to the beginning of a dialogue on substantive political and constitutional issues in Burma must be supported by all means available.”

On **21 November**, the SPDC released 115 prisoners, including members of the NLD. It was the largest single release of prisoners since the beginning of the process of confidence building between the SPDC and the NLD in October 2000.

In his **December** report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro stated that the release of prisoners demonstrated the “continuing goodwill of the SPDC to ease the political atmosphere.” Pinheiro said that as a result of the climate of political expectancy generated by the “secret talks” initiated two years earlier, repression of peaceful political activities had somewhat softened. “The 6 May 2002 statement by the SPDC was interpreted by many Burmese citizens as a signal that a page effectively had been turned and that the space for political activities was being reopened,” concluded Pinheiro.



CHR, 58th session, 10 January 2002, E/CN.4/2002/45



CHR, 58th session, 18 March 2002, E/CN.4/2002/35



UNGA, 57th session, 9 August 2002, A/57/290



CHR, 59th session, 27 December 2002, E/CN.4/2003/41

2003

On **22 March**, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro interrupted his visit to Burma after discovering a listening device placed under the table in the room where he was conducting interviews with political prisoners in Rangoon’s Insein prison. On **31 March**, Pinheiro addressed the UN Commission on Human Rights, criticizing the SPDC’s lack of progress in talks. “[...] Progress has regrettably been very limited and not at the pace or level that I had expected,” Pinheiro said.

On **30 May**, NLD members and supporters accompanying Daw Aung San Suu Kyi were attacked by pro-junta thugs near Depayin, Sagaing Division. As a result, more than 100 NLD members and elected MP, supporters, monks and students, were arrested, killed, wounded and missing. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, her deputy Tin Oo, and other NLD leaders, were subsequently detained.

In **July**, UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail urged the UN and ASEAN to coordinate efforts to obtain the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and promote reconciliation. A UN spokesman stated that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expected Razali to “work with government officials toward her immediate and unconditional release.”

Following intense international pressure, the SPDC allowed UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail to visit Rangoon from **6 to 10 June**. The regime successfully hijacked the agenda so that instead of facilitating dialogue, Mr Razali's efforts were focused on obtaining a brief meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Than Shwe chose to snub Razali and show his contempt for the UN process by going on a beach vacation during Razali's trip.

In his **August** report to the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro said that "the deadlock symptoms with regard to the dialogue and escalating political tensions contributed to setting the scene for the tragic events of the night of 30 May, followed by a significant deterioration of the human rights situation." "The 30 May incident has undone in one stroke all the progress that had been achieved since the process of dialogue began in 2000", Pinheiro added.

On **30 August**, the new SPDC Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced the regime's "seven-point roadmap to democracy." The roadmap was a response to heightened regional and international pressure following the Depayin massacre. Some members of the international community hailed it as a positive initiative towards a process of political transition.

On **8 September**, UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail announced that the SPDC had scrapped plans for him to visit Burma that month.

On **29 September**, at the UN General Assembly, SPDC Foreign Minister Win Aung responded to criticism that the SPDC was not committed to democratization and reconciliation by assuring that they had "the political will," Win Aung also attempted to reduce pressure regarding Daw Suu, saying, "We don't call this house arrest."



UNGA, 58th session, 5 August 2003, UN Doc A/58/219

2004

On **4 March**, at the end of a four-day visit to Burma, UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail emerged confident that SPDC-NLD relations were improving. Razali said SPDC Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt appeared committed to allowing democracy, but needed "more power to push it through." "I am convinced that the Prime Minister wants to move the process forward all the way to democracy," Razali said. Razali also said that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to "turn the page" and work "in a harmonized relationship" with the junta. During his talks with Gen Khin Nyunt and NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Razali was said to have suggested the creation of a "constitution-drafting council" ahead of the National Convention. The forum would allow a tripartite dialogue between the junta, the NLD, and the ethnic nationalities. Having failed once again to secure Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release, or any breakthrough in the democratization process, Razali was nevertheless "encouraged by the expressions of commitment of the Prime Minister to implement, in an all-inclusive manner, the Government's seven-step roadmap, starting with the reconvening of the National Convention."

The regime's "pragmatists", Foreign Minister Win Aung and Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt continued to mesmerize the international community with promises to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and include the NLD in the National Convention. UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail expressed similar optimism following his visit to Rangoon in early March. He said that 16 April had been fixed as an "informal deadline" for the Nobel Laureate's release. Razali had to set a new deadline for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release after the National Convention started without her in May 2004. Razali said the NLD leader's detention was unacceptable and that he hoped to set a timeframe for her release "well before" ASEAN's annual summit in Vientiane, Laos, in November.

With the departure of SPDC Foreign Minister Win Aung on **18 September**, Razali's standing with the regime weakened. Win Aung was considered a "moderate", in favor of engagement with the international community and close to General Khin Nyunt, the junta's PM and main interlocutor to Razali.



CHR, 60th session, 5 January 2004, E/CN.4/2004/33



UNGA, 59th session, 30 August 2004, A/59/311



CHR, 61st session, 2 December 2004, E/CN.4/2005/36

2005

In his **March** report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said that the National Convention did not adhere to the recommendations made by successive resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights. Annan appealed to the SPDC to “resume without delay a substantive political dialogue with the representatives of all ethnic nationality groups and political leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to help achieve a genuine process of national reconciliation.”

In **December**, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan designated UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari to conduct the first-ever briefing on Burma at the UN Security Council. The UNSC heard the briefing on Burma on **16 December**. Gambari became the UN Secretary General envoy for Burma.



CHR, 61st session, 7 March 2005, E/CN.4/2005/130



UNGA, 60th session, 12 August 2005, A/60/221

2006

In **January**, UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail resigned frustrated at being barred from entering the country for nearly two years. “My contract lapsed after December 2005. It is clear they [the military junta] do not want me back,” Razali said. “I have not been allowed to visit the [Burma] leadership in [Rangoon] in the past 22 months.” Razali visited Burma 12 times as Special Envoy.

On 20 May, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He was the first foreigner who had been allowed to visit Daw Suu since Razali’s last mission to Burma in March 2004. Gambari’s unexpected meeting with Daw Suu prompted speculation that Daw Suu would be released when her detention expired on 27 May. These expectations were heightened when SPDC police chief Maj-Gen Khin Yi publicly admitted that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest was unlikely to pose a threat to the country’s political stability. However, on **27 May**, the SPDC extended Daw Suu’s detention for another year.

On **31 May**, Gambari briefed the UN Security Council on his visit to Burma. At the briefing, Gambari expressed the UN Secretariat’s disappointment over the SPDC’s failure to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

On **27 November**, Gambari briefed the UN Security Council on his 9-12 November trip to Burma. Gambari said the military authorities had made “some small steps” since his previous visit in May, but he warned that the “good offices” process of the Secretary General towards Burma “cannot be open ended.” “We are now waiting for the government to [take] further steps to respond to the concerns of the international community. The ball is clearly in the court of the government,” he added.



CHR, 62nd session, 7 February 2006, E/CN.4/2006/34



UNGA, 61st session, 21 September 2006, A/61/369

2007

In his **February** report to the UN Human Rights Committee (former Commission on Human Rights), UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro concluded that the SPDC had decided to refuse to cooperate with the Human Rights Council. The human rights concerns enumerated in the report were the same as those highlighted in his previous reports since 2001. Pinheiro said that the willingness to address human rights problems, which the SPDC had shown six years earlier, had disappeared. Pinheiro said the SPDC had not demonstrated any willingness to concede space for a political opening, nor for the promised move towards democratization.

On **22 May**, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon designated Ibrahim Gambari as his Special Advisor on Burma. In this capacity, Gambari continued the “good offices” role that he had performed as the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

On **5 October**, both UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari addressed UN Security Council members on the situation in Burma. Ban Ki-moon said that the use of force to put down peaceful protests in Burma was “abhorrent and unacceptable.” He also urged the SPDC to release detainees and start a dialogue with political opponents.

On **11 October**, the UN Security Council issued a statement “strongly” deploring the SPDC’s repression of pro-democracy demonstrators and called for the early release of all political prisoners and remaining detainees. It also called on the SPDC and all other parties concerned to work together towards a de-escalation of the situation and a peaceful solution.

On **2 November**, the SPDC ordered the expulsion of UN humanitarian coordinator in Rangoon, Charles Petrie. In a 24 October statement, Petrie had criticized the junta for holding back Burma’s development and for not addressing high levels of malnutrition and poverty. Petrie had also called on the junta to heed the voices of protesters.

On **3 November**, UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari visited Burma in an attempt to kick start dialogue between the SPDC and the NLD.

On **6 November**, SPDC Information Minister Kyaw Hsan told Gambari that his proposal for UN-led tripartite dialogue between Gambari, the junta, and Daw Aung San Kyi “will not be possible.” Kyaw Hsan also lectured Gambari about the UN’s ties with “big power bullies” and voiced the SPDC’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of Gambari’s previous visit, which was followed by sanctions from the US, Australia, and the EU as well as condemnation from the UN Security Council.

On **11 November**, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro was allowed to visit the country for the first time in four years. Pinheiro’s presence in Burma did not deter the SPDC from arresting numerous activists in Rangoon. The SPDC organized and controlled Pinheiro’s agenda. Two of the five days of the mission were entirely devoted to meetings with SPDC officials. Pinheiro was granted limited access to monasteries, places of detention, and other locations where human rights violations occurred. Pinheiro’s visits to Insein Prison took place in an atmosphere of allegations that the SPDC had transferred key political prisoners to other location to prevent Pinheiro from meeting with them



HRC, 4th session, 12 February 2007, A/HRC/4/14



HRC, 6th session, 7 December 2007, A/HRC/6/14

2008

On **6 March**, UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari arrived in Burma for a five-day official visit. On 7 March, Gambari met with SPDC Information Minister Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan and other junta officials. Kyaw Hsan roundly rejected UN requests for opening the constitutional drafting process and more substantive political dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. “It is impossible to review or rewrite the constitution [...],” Kyaw Hsan said. Kyaw Hsan also accused Gambari of “bias” and “act[ing]

outside [his] role as mediator” by releasing a statement from Daw Suu in November. He expressed unhappiness with Gambari's trips to other countries in the region and warned that his role as an “impartial adviser” would be brought into question if he follows suggestions from Western nations. Gambari also met with members of the SPDC-appointed referendum commission. The regime rejected offers of UN technical assistance and help with providing observers at the referendum. Referendum commissioner Thaung Nyunt told Gambari the military had enough experience with running elections.

On **14 March**, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro slammed the SPDC for its patently false claims of democratization. “There is a contradiction between what the government of Myanmar says it is doing, and what is really happening,” Pinheiro said. “If you believe in gnomes, trolls, and elves, you can believe in this process of democracy in Myanmar,” he added. “No referendum or elections can be fair, no transition to democracy can be effective, without the release of political prisoners, the authorization for all political parties to operate, and the protection of the basic civil and political freedoms, all non-existent in Myanmar,” Pinheiro concluded. The SPDC denied Pinheiro a travel visa despite a UN Human Rights Council request for a follow-up visit. in Myanmar,” Pinheiro concluded. The SPDC denied Pinheiro a travel visa despite a UN Human Rights Council request for a follow-up visit.

In his last report presented to the Human Rights Council as UN Special Rapporteur on Burma in **March**, Pinheiro said that the SPDC’s willingness to address human rights abuses had “disappeared.”

On **28 March**, the Human Rights Council appointed Argentine Tomás Ojea Quintana as the new UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma.



HRC, 7th session, 5 March 2008, A/HRC/7/18



HRC, 7th session, 7 March 2008, A/HRC/7/24



HRC, 8th session, 3 June 2008, A/HRC/8/12